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Last updated 7 November 2026. Describes the Toddle Enhancement Extension: version 0.16.0, the one on the Chrome Web Store. Between store releases, fixes are tested as patch releases, which do not go to the store. For schools, and for the privacy, legal and IT colleagues who review software on their behalf.
At a glance
- Runs on
- web.toddleapp.com only. No access to any other site.
- Permissions
- storage, and Toddle's own site. Nothing else.
- Reads
- Toddle, through an exact list of read-only queries, for the teacher at the screen, with what that teacher's account can already see.
- Writes
- Nothing. Write operations are refused outright.
- Sends
- Nothing it reads, to anyone but Toddle. Besides Toddle itself (its own interface, and student photos from wherever Toddle serves them), three outside connections, none carrying Toddle data: feedback, when a person presses Send (Toddle compatibility reports, masked and with no student data, go the same way, only when sent or switched on); while there is a licence, a daily download of a signed list of cancelled keys; and, when a claim link from a licence email is used, one request carrying only the link's code, which returns the key.
- Stores
- Settings, a licence key, the last licence check's result, the email of the Toddle account last seen and a masked Toddle compatibility record, on the device; the licence key also in Chrome's sync, never sent to Nyuchi. A school's key, set through Chrome policy, is read from the policy and not copied. No student data.
- Tested
- Closed-loop tests, a regression test for every review finding, and an end-to-end run that records every request and attempts page-script attacks. Every release is gated on them.
- Reviewed
- Two adversarial reviews: 1 October 2026, every finding fixed in 0.8.2; and 6 October 2026, every finding fixed in 0.8.4, a test build, whose fixes reached schools in 0.9.0. Version 0.11.0 fixed two weaknesses in how licence keys were checked, set out under the second review. What 0.16.0 added (a school's licence by Chrome policy, and the Toddle compatibility checks and reports) was reviewed against the same threat model.
To report a vulnerability, email security@nyuchi.com with the subject "Security". We acknowledge within 3 working days.
The security model
The extension is a closed loop: it reads Toddle, for the teacher at the screen, and puts what it reads back on that same screen. Each of the following is a statement about how the software is built, and each is held in place by a test.
It runs only on Toddle
The extension is declared against https://web.toddleapp.com and
nothing else. It has no access to any other website, and takes no action anywhere
else.
Two permissions
It asks Chrome for storage, to keep its settings, and for Toddle's own
site. Nothing more: no access to tabs, history, downloads or other sites, no pages
that websites can reach or frame, and no loosening of Chrome's own content security
policy for extensions. One outside page may send it a message, and no extension can:
Nyuchi's licence claim page,
https://licenses.nyuchi.com/claim, named alone in the
manifest's externally_connectable (from version 0.12.0), which can hand
over the one-time token from a licence email's link and nothing else. No web page can
read anything from the extension through it.
Its background worker opens the welcome page on install, and again when a licence is activated; opens the licence page when the extension's own toolbar asks, accepting that request only from the extension itself; when the claim page hands it a token, checked by the sender's origin and path and the token's exact shape, opens the extension's own licence page with it and answers only that it got it, fetching nothing itself; and, while there is a licence key, makes the daily check for cancelled keys described below.
A school's licence can be set by its IT as Chrome policy for the extension. The
extension only reads that policy, which nothing on Toddle's page and nothing a
teacher does can set or change; a key from it goes through the same checks as a typed
one and is never written to the extension's storage or Chrome's sync, and the
extension's pages never show it. An organisation key is accepted only from policy.
Anyone who can open chrome://policy on a managed device can read it there,
which is accepted because an organisation key works only for accounts at the school's
own domains.
Read-only, by an exact list
Every query the extension may send to Toddle is written out, word for word, in one file. The channel that sends them refuses anything that is not on that list exactly, with variables of the expected shape, and sends only to Toddle's own API, checked again immediately before each request. None of the queries writes, and any write is refused, so the extension cannot change a gradebook, a record or a setting even by accident. On the home page and the Attendance dashboard it adds a few fields to Toddle's own request instead of sending a second one, and takes them out again before Toddle's page sees the answer.
It reuses the session the teacher is already signed in with, so Toddle answers with what that teacher's account may already see, and no more. It never asks for a password. It notes the sign-in headers from Toddle's own requests, in the tab's memory, in one script inside Toddle's page, and sends them nowhere but Toddle; they are never stored. Its message buttons open Toddle's own chat window, on real clicks only; the extension sends no message itself, and Toddle's chat applies the school's messaging rules.
Nothing it reads leaves, and three outside connections
There is no account, no analytics, no telemetry, no tracking, no advertising and no remote code. What the extension reads from Toddle goes back to Toddle's own screen and nowhere else. Besides Toddle itself (its own interface, with the teacher's session, and student photos from the address Toddle gives for each one), it makes three connections, and none carries anything it reads from Toddle:
- Feedback. The Send feedback form in the toolbar menu sends only when a person presses Send, carrying only what they typed (a topic, a message, an email address if they give one) and the extension's version number, to Nyuchi's feedback form, processed by Formspree. Nothing that runs inside a Toddle page refers to it. See the privacy policy. A Toddle compatibility report goes through the same form, from the licence page or the menu only, when the teacher presses Send report or has switched on sending them automatically (off unless they do; then at most once an hour, when something changes). It holds only the masked shape of Toddle's page structure, made by one function that masks digits, ids, emails and any word outside a fixed structural vocabulary, and tested with names, emails, marks and comments: no student data. It added no permission, host or address.
-
A daily check for cancelled keys. At most
once a day, only while there is a licence key (one entered, or the school's, set through Chrome policy), the background worker makes one plain request
to
https://licenses.nyuchi.com/v1/revocations(versions before 0.9.0 askedlicences.nyuchi.dev, the same server). It sends no licence key, no identifiers, no cookies and no Toddle data. It downloads a list, signed by Nyuchi, of the fingerprints (SHA-256 hashes) of cancelled keys, and checks its own key against it locally. Cloudflare sees the IP address, as with any web request; Nyuchi does not log it. If the list cannot be fetched, the last result stands, so a network outage never switches a licence off. -
Redeeming a claim link (from version
0.12.0). Only when a teacher opens the one-time link from their licence email and
clicks Add it to Chrome, or pastes the link into the licence page, the licence page
sends the link's token, and nothing else, in one request to
https://licenses.nyuchi.com/v1/claims/redeem, with no cookies and no referrer, and activates the key that comes back exactly as a typed one. The link works once, for 72 hours; the server keeps only its hash. See the privacy policy.
Anything else happens only when the teacher does it: saving an Excel or CSV file, opening an email or phone link, or sending a message in Toddle's own chat.
Licence keys are checked on the device
A licence key is a signed statement that the extension verifies on the device, against a public key it carries. A key carries the buyer's email address, and may also name who it is for: the buyer's email, or for an organisation licence the school's email domain. Where it does, the extension compares that with the Toddle account signed in, inside the browser only, and sends it nowhere. A key that names no one works for any account until it expires. Activating a pasted key contacts nothing; a key from a claim link is fetched once, as above, and then checked the same way. The extension never sends the key to Nyuchi or anywhere else. It is kept in the extension's own storage, which Toddle's page cannot reach. The licence key, and nothing else, is also kept in Chrome's synced storage for the extension, so Chrome carries it to the other computers signed in to the same Chrome account, unless sync, or a school's Chrome policy, turns that off. That is Chrome's own sync, through your Google account; the extension never sends the key to Nyuchi. A key carries the buyer's email address, so that travels with it. The newest key wins on every computer, and removing it on one removes it on all of them. Who a key is for, and the result of the check for cancelled keys, stay on each computer. A school's licence set by its IT through Chrome policy is different: the extension reads it from the policy on each managed browser, and never copies it into its own storage or into Chrome's sync.
No student data on the device
In the extension's own storage: the teacher's switches, the licence key if one was entered (also in Chrome's sync), the result of the last check for cancelled keys, the email of the Toddle account last seen signed in, to check who a licence is for, and the Toddle compatibility record, masked, with the teacher's choice about sending reports. In Toddle's own site storage, three housekeeping values: whether flags are concealed, the My classes choice, and the academic year Toddle is showing. No student data is stored anywhere. What it reads about students, classes and timetables is held in the Toddle tab's memory until the tab is closed or reloaded; a student's or a class's details are reused for at most 5 minutes, and a student's day for at most 2, before Toddle is asked again.
The extension does not hide Toddle's own student flags; a staff member can choose to conceal them for a shared screen with the free flag switch. The sidebar asks Toddle for a student's flags each time it opens, and keeps them only while it is open. The Excel and CSV exports are made in the browser and saved where the teacher's downloads go, by the teacher's choice.
Out of Toddle's page, into closed shadow roots
The extension is being rebuilt so that as little of it as possible runs where Toddle's own scripts run. In version 0.16.0, the flag switch, the student sidebar with a class's teachers, the home page's My classes option and teacher names, the gradebook's toolbar and controls, and the Attendance dashboard's details run in the extension's own isolated part of the browser. What they draw on Toddle's pages sits inside closed shadow roots, which no script on Toddle's page can read or click into, and whether each one runs is decided by the extension's own switches and licence, never by Toddle's page. What only Toddle's page holds (who was clicked, the course list as it loads, Toddle's chat) is read by small parts with no interface of their own, which talk to the extension on private channels set up before Toddle's own scripts run.
Protections inside the page
Part of the extension still has to run inside Toddle's page, to read the gradebook and what Toddle draws, which means it shares that page with Toddle's own scripts. It is protected as far as a page allows:
- Toddle's sign-in headers stay in one script in Toddle's page. The extension's other parts never see them.
- Its public objects are frozen, so a page script cannot rewrite them.
- Answers to its queries travel on a private channel, never broadcast, so no other script can read them. A script already listening in the page could still answer in their place (see the limits).
- The query gate uses JavaScript built-ins captured before any page script runs, so a page that replaces them cannot widen it.
- Messages that change what is shown, such as licensed features or student flags, carry a secret shared only between the extension's own parts, new on every page load. It stops scripts that are not listening for it; a script already listening can read it (see the limits).
- Text read from Toddle is shown as text and never interpreted as markup. Values in the CSV export cannot start a spreadsheet formula, and the Excel export holds no formula at all: every text is written as text.
How it is tested
The guarantees above are not left to good intentions. Every proposed change runs these, and a release cannot be published unless all of them pass.
- Closed-loop tests
- Fail on any new permission or page reachable from websites; anything the background worker does beyond its job; any network or storage side door; any address that is not Toddle's or Nyuchi's; any extra field on the feedback form; any message listener that does not check where a message came from; and any query whose text or variables differ from the list.
- A regression test for every finding
- Every finding from adversarial review has at least one permanent test, each of which fails on the code as it was before the fix, so a fix cannot quietly come undone.
- End to end, with a network recorder
- The built extension is loaded into Chromium and used as a teacher would use it, on stand-in Toddle pages with made-up students. Every request the browser makes is recorded, and the run fails on any that goes outside Toddle. Page-script attacks (forged queries, overheard answers, forged settings, forged flag messages) are attempted, and must fail.
- Every release is gated
- The tests run on every pull request and again in the release itself, which stops before anything is published if either fails.
Adversarial reviews
The extension has had two adversarial reviews, with proofs of concept run against the real extension. They considered a malicious script in Toddle's page, a malicious website in another tab, another extension, and crafted responses from Toddle. Every finding was fixed, and each fix carries a regression test.
1 October 2026
The first review, of the code that became version 0.8.2 (findings 1 to 12), found two high-severity issues, one medium and several low. All of them were fixed in version 0.8.2.
High Fixed in 0.8.2
Gradebook text could run script. Rich text read from Toddle (rubric labels, single-point rubric responses, remarks) was cleaned in a way that still let a crafted image tag run script in the teacher's Toddle page.
Fix. Toddle's rich text is read into an inert document, as text, never as markup.
High Fixed in 0.8.2
The CSV export could carry spreadsheet formulas. A value beginning with a formula character was exported as it was, and a spreadsheet would have run it.
Fix. Such values are prefixed so a spreadsheet opens them as plain text.
Medium Fixed in 0.8.2
A page script could redirect the extension's queries with the teacher's session. The address the extension sent its queries to could be swapped by another script in the page, so Toddle's sign-in could have reached a foreign host.
Fix. The address is fixed once as a plain string, checked to be Toddle's API, and checked again immediately before every request.
Low Fixed in 0.8.2
The query gate relied on JavaScript built-ins a page script could replace, which would have let it accept anything.
Fix. The gate captures what it needs before any page script runs, and checks by hand.
Low Fixed in 0.8.2
An email address could add hidden recipients to a mail link.
Fix. A strict address pattern, and every mail link built one way, with the address encoded.
Low Fixed in 0.8.2
Answers to the extension's queries were broadcast in the page, where another script could read them or answer first with forged data.
Fix. Each question carries a private channel, and answers travel only on it.
Low Fixed in 0.8.2
A page script could plant a class with a fake teacher in the extension's short-lived cache.
Fix. That door was removed.
Low Fixed in 0.8.2
A page script could switch on licensed features.
Fix. Only the extension can, with a secret shared once per page load.
Low Fixed in 0.8.2
The licence page could be framed or probed by a website.
Fix. No extension page is reachable from websites, and the licence and welcome pages refuse to run in a frame.
Info Fixed in 0.8.2
A look-alike query list defined before the extension's was kept; the gradebook's grid hooks were writable; any page script could ask for hidden flags to be shown.
Fix. A look-alike list shuts the query channel; the grid hooks are private; showing flags needs the per-load secret.
Hardening Fixed in 0.8.2
Message buttons could be pressed by a script.
Fix. They act on real clicks only.
The issues were present in released versions from 0.5.0 to 0.8.1, depending on the finding. Only 0.8.2 and later are supported; Chrome updates installed copies from the Chrome Web Store on its own, and a school that pins a version should move to the current one. The review also attempted, and found held: running a query outside the list, or a write; making the extension send to any host but Toddle's; reading the licence key from the page; reaching the feedback form from Toddle's page; and opening an extension page from a website.
6 October 2026
The second review covered everything new in version 0.8.4, a test release: the extension's own pages, rebuilt; the first rebuilt part that runs on Toddle's pages (the flags switch, in a closed shadow root that no script on the page can reach); the build that makes them; and the new switches. It also re-read the code that runs in Toddle's page against the claims made about it. It found two medium-severity issues and two low (findings 13 to 16). All were fixed in version 0.8.4, and the fixes are in every release after it, including 0.16.0. None was in version 0.8.2. Each later step of the rebuild (the student sidebar, the home page, the gradebook's toolbar and the Attendance dashboard's details) was reviewed the same way as it was made, and what those reviews found about the page's limits is set out below.
Medium Fixed in 0.8.4
The rebuilt flags code handed over its secret on request. A script in the page could ask it for its state, and the per-load secret came back with the answer.
Fix. It no longer answers requests. The page half always starts first and is told of every change.
Medium Fixed in 0.8.4
The key that signs releases could reach third-party build tools. The tools that build the extension's own pages ran with the release job's settings, the signing key among them.
Fix. The page build gets only a short list of ordinary settings. No secret is among them, and one added later would not reach it either.
Low Fixed in 0.8.4
An element on Toddle's page could stop the rebuilt features from starting, by taking a name the extension uses to make sure it starts only once.
Fix. Each of those checks now looks for exactly the value the extension sets, which an element on the page cannot be.
Low Fixed in 0.8.4
What ships was not scanned. The tests read the source code, but not the built files that ship, with React and the other packages in them.
Fix. A test now reads the built files: no eval, no cookie or other side channel, one network call in all of it (the feedback form, never on Toddle's pages), only known addresses, closed shadow roots and no inline script.
Info Fixed in 0.8.4
An unused package, a wrong comment in the test runner, and wording in the extension's own documents that claimed more than the code inside Toddle's page can hold.
Fix. Removed and corrected. The limits are set out below.
It also checked, and found sound: the package that ships, the permissions it asks for (storage and Toddle only, nothing reachable from websites), the built pages, the network (the same two outside requests as before), and the list of packages the build uses.
Version 0.11.0: licence keys. Two weaknesses in how the extension checked licence keys were fixed in 0.11.0, and the fixes are in 0.16.0. A cancelled or refunded key could be made to work again by writing it in a different but equivalent form, which the check for cancelled keys did not recognise; a key is now accepted only in exactly the form it was issued in. And because the same signature covers keys and the list of cancelled keys, the extension now accepts only a licence as a licence. Both concerned whether a licence is valid; neither touched what the extension reads from Toddle. Every key, as it was issued, keeps working.
We publish what was found, not only that it was fixed, because a school deciding whether to trust software should know.
What no extension can promise
Any script that Toddle itself loads into its pages shares those pages, and the signed-in teacher's access, with or without this extension installed. Toddle's pages are served without a Content-Security-Policy, which would otherwise limit what scripts can run there.
That is a property of Toddle, not of the extension, and nothing an extension does can remove it. What the extension does is make sure it adds nothing such a script could use that it did not already have, and widens no access: it adds no new script sources, does not change Toddle's own security settings, answers only its own fixed list of read-only queries, and sends nothing it reads anywhere but Toddle. A school that wants that risk reduced further should raise it with Toddle.
The flag switch is a privacy aid, not a security control. It conceals flags on the screen; it does not hide names, and does not stop anyone deliberately opening a student's flags or profile. Concealing is a screen, not a lock. A concealed flag can still show that a student has a flag. Concealing changes only what is drawn on the screen, never Toddle's data, and does not stop anyone at the computer opening a student's flags in Toddle.
What the code inside Toddle's page cannot promise
Some of the extension has to run in Toddle's own page, because that is the only place Toddle's data can be read, and any script on the page shares that space. The review of 6 October 2026 set out, plainly, what that means. A script that is already listening in Toddle's page when the extension starts:
- can read the per-load secrets, which stop only scripts that are not listening, and replay them in that browser: switch a licensed feature on, give the licence check another account's email, or clear flags that were concealed. It gains no student data by it, because it already runs with the teacher's session and could read Toddle directly;
- cannot overhear the answers to the extension's queries, but can answer first with false ones, so the gradebook could show wrong figures. Values in the CSV export still cannot start a spreadsheet formula, and the Excel export still holds none;
- is stopped from pressing the extension's message buttons, but can tell Toddle's own app to open a chat in any case;
- if it was in the page before Toddle's own scripts (a page that opened Toddle in a new window can be), can take the private channel the home page's part uses, and so show a wrong teacher's name, as text, or offer My classes where it should not. Whether a feature runs is still never decided from the page.
None of this lets anything leave the browser, write to Toddle, or reach the extension's own pages, licence key or storage. The fix is the rebuild under way, which is moving every decision and every piece of the interface out of Toddle's page into the extension's own, leaving there only what has to read the page.
Reporting a vulnerability
Email security@nyuchi.com with the subject "Security". Please include the extension version (in its toolbar menu), what an attacker could do and from where, and the steps or a proof of concept; describe rather than include any real student data. We acknowledge within 3 working days, confirm or rule it out within 10 working days, and fix a critical or high finding within 7 days, a medium within 30, and a low in the next release.
The extension's source repository is private, so the full policy is published here: the vulnerability disclosure policy sets out the scope (this website, the extension and the licence server), what we commit to, and safe harbour for good-faith research. It is also listed in security.txt.
Related
- Privacy policy — exactly what the extension reads, stores and sends.
- Data handling and student privacy — what Nyuchi holds, who processes it, breach notification and data processing agreements.
- Terms of use and service.
- Deploying to a school — force-install from the Google Admin console by extension ID.
If your data protection officer or IT team has questions this page does not answer, or would like to review the code before approving it, write to support@nyuchi.com, or for privacy questions and data processing agreements, privacy@nyuchi.com.